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The history of IVF in India is debatably as old as the history of
IVF itself. Its origin was contested and its subsequent
development no less so. IVF laid the foundation for assisted
conception treatment in India and created the ground on
which contests for the legitimate ownership of the first
‘test-tube baby miracle’ were fought.
IVF in India became a contested terrain in part because of
the pursuit for credit (reward) and credibility (ability to do
science) by its practitioners (Latour and Woolgar, 1979).6.06.002
lished by Elsevier Ltd. This is a
nd/4.0/).However, this article hopes to show that the construction and
validation of scientific and technological knowledge is not only a
mutual give-and-take between scientists (Latour and Woolgar,
1979) but is also part of a wider social network that includes the
media as one of the key players. The pursuit of credit and
credibility in the Indian IVF saga was amplified by the media’s
rhetoric on assisted conception techniques as the long-awaited
answer to the biosocial problem of infertility (Bharadwaj,
2000). Themedia thus became one of the prominent domains in
which the contested beginnings of IVF were settled. This article
charts an important fragment of contemporary history of IVF inn open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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attempts to reveal the politics underscoring assisted conception
by focusing on the disputed claims of various medical
practitioners at the forefront of producing the first test-tube
baby in India. The story of the first IVF baby in India reveals a
rejection by the scientific community of claims unsubstantiated
by peer review (also see Bharadwaj, 2013a,b,c). The article
argues that the pursuit of peer-endorsed credibility is not
always a key motivation for scientists and scientific work and
that the generation and attribution of scientific credibility is
fundamentally multi-centred, spread across domains such as
clinics, laboratories and themedia. In arguing the importance of
politics and power relations in the practice of science, the ways
in which scientific ‘facts’ are constructed and contested are
revealed.
The development of IVF in India is largely dependent on
several interconnected factors. First, the ‘experts’
successfully left the state sector in order to function with
an otherwise unattainable degree of autonomy and free-
dom. Second, once they had left, they used the media not
only to carve out a niche in the infertility market, but also,
more importantly, to set in motion a competition for
respect, status and credit. Indeed, many media accounts
of assisted conception in the 1980s and 1990s appear as
little more than attempts to promote the reach and
penetration of various practitioners in the infertility
market, creating a media/medicine nexus. By the closing
years of the 1980s the story of assisted conception took a
new turn with the rapid emergence of new players in the
field. Scientists and clinicians enthused by the results of the
media ‘binge’ on the success of the ‘first scientifically
documented test tube baby’ took the plunge to claim their
share of media credit and recognition (for details, see
Bharadwaj, 2000). Third, since 1991, India, in line with
its policy of economic liberalization, has incentivized
technological management of infertility. Fourth, the stigma
attached to infertility and an almost oppressive cultural
expectation to contribute living children to society
(Bharadwaj, 2016) has increased existing demand for
treatment in the face of new technological breakthroughs.
Fifth, the segment of the Indian medical tourism market
dedicated to assisted reproduction was valued at over
$450 million per annum, and the Indian Council of Medical
Research (ICMR) predicted this to grow to a $6 billion
market by 2008 (Smerdon, 2009). No current assessments
indicate whether this gargantuan figure has now been
reached or surpassed. Sixth, IVF has enjoyed almost
unregulated growth in the private sector. While the ICMR
has formulated extensive guidelines, these have been
awaiting ratification by the Indian Parliament for over a
decade and still remain as mere guidelines. Additionally,
the ICMR introduced a centralized registry which currently
lists 385 clinics. However, estimates of the number of IVF
clinics operating in India continue to vary widely. For
example, as of 2010, the International Federation of
Fertility Societies had reported more than 500 IVF clinics
in the country (Jones et al., 2010), whereas some rather
more speculative calculations predict over 30,000 function-
ing assisted reproductive technology facilities in India
(Sarojini et al., 2011).Materials and methods
This article is embedded in an ethnographic project spanning
15 years. During this period the author returned to India at
least once every year to (re)establish contact with over 30 IVF
clinics and track new developments. The article is based on
data distilled from daily newspapers, popular magazines,
articles in science journals, television reports, documentaries,
talk shows and serialized programmes to piece together
evidence scattered over multiple terrains of analysis and
description. There is further engagement with government
reports, guidelines and proposed regulatory bills. Information
on television programmes was obtained from informant
doctors as part of the fieldwork and cannot be referenced,
as exact broadcast dates are unavailable. Excerpts from two
interviews with research scientists on the sensitive topic of
tensions underscoring the history of IVF in India could not be
tape recorded. The persons concerned were anxious to speak
but requested complete anonymity. The identities of those
covered in media reports are not concealed as these names
are already in the public domain. Anonymization in this latter
case is highly unlikely to succeed, as the key protagonists
featured in the article are virtually synonymous with devel-
opments related to IVF in India. The research reported here
fulfils all prevailing institutional ethical requirements and
data protection procedures.
The past rewritten
With the birth of the first ‘scientifically documented’
test-tube baby, Harsha, on 6 August 1986, India officially
entered the brave new world of assisted conception. The use
of the term ‘scientifically documented’ is deliberate, as it
was repeated ad nauseam in scientific circles to negate the
parallel claims of a similar breakthrough made by a doctor in
1978, only months after the birth of the world’s very first
test-tube baby, Louise Brown, in the UK.
On 3 October 1978, the birth of the world’s second test-tube
babywas announced by Dr SubhasMukerji in Calcutta. The news
was widely reported in the media in India and to some extent
abroad. Mukerji’s claim, however, was contested because he
did not publish the bulk of his research work in standard
peer-reviewed journals. Ironically, 19 years later, the story of
Mukerji’s test-tube baby was retold by Dr TC Anand Kumar, the
man most closely associated with India’s first ‘scientifically
documented’ IVF baby. It was Anand Kumar and his collabora-
tors in Bombay who produced Harsha as India’s ‘first’ test-tube
baby. By Anand Kumar’s own admission, ‘Harsha was described
as India’s first “scientifically documented” test-tube baby
because the details of Mukerji’s work were not then available’
(Anand Kumar, 1997: 526). Delivering the Subhas Mukerji
Memorial Oration at the third National Congress on Assisted
Reproductive Technology and Advances in Infertility Manage-
ment, held in Calcutta on 8 February 1997, Anand Kumar made
an appeal that Mukerji should be credited posthumously for
creating India’s first test-tube baby. Two months later, he
followed up his appeal with the publication of an article in the
journal Current Science, entitled ‘Architect of India’s first test
tube baby: Dr Subhas Mukerji (16 January 1931 to 19 July 1981)’
(Anand Kumar, 1997). The story of Mukerji’s long-forgotten past
was resurrected with the publication of this article. Kumar’s
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had come to believe – that Mukerji did indeed produce India’s
first test-tube baby in 1978.
Mukerji was a medical graduate of Calcutta University,
where he also obtained a DPhil. He was awarded the Colombo
Plan scholarship to work in the MRC Clinical Endocrinology
Research Unit in Edinburgh under Professor John A Loraine, a
reproductive physiologist. In his paper, Anand Kumar (1997)
offers an exhaustive documentation of Mukerji’s presentations
at various scientific and public fora, along with detailed
descriptions of his research interests and analysis of the IVF
technique that he employed to produce a baby girl, who was
given the pseudonym Durga. Anand Kumar undertook this
systematic exercise to demonstrate that, even in the absence
of published scientific papers in leading journals, Mukerji’s
work was truly monumental and ground-breaking. According to
Anand Kumar, Mukerji was ‘far ahead of his time in successfully
using an ovarian stimulation protocol before anyone else in the
world had thought of doing so’ (529). He continues:
It may be noted that Subhas Mukerji reported the successful
cryopreservation of an eight-cell embryo, storing it for 53 days,
thawing and replacing it into the mother’s womb, resulting in a
successful and live birth as early as 1978 – a full five years before
anyone else had done so. This small publication of Mukerji in
1978 clearly shows that Mukerji was on the right line of thinking
much before anyone else had demonstrated the successful
outcome of a pregnancy following the transfer of an eight-cell
frozen-thawed embryo into human subjects transferring eight-
cell cryopreserved embryos (530).
After this breakthrough, Mukerji’s happiness was
short-lived. The government of West Bengal appointed an
‘expert committee’ under the Indian Medical Association and
the Bengal Obstetrics and Gynecology Association to investi-
gate the veracity of Mukerji’s claims. The inquiry committee
met on 18 November 1978, to critically review Mukerji’s
report to the West Bengal Government’s Director of Health
Services (DHS); they rejected Mukerji’s claim. Anand Kumar
questions this, as the committee was headed by a professor of
radiophysics and composed of a gynaecologist, physiologist
and neurophysiologist. None of these committee members, he
argues, ‘could have had any background or insight intomodern
reproductive technologies, a subject upon which they were to
hold an inquiry’ (1997: 528).
In a letter to the DHS dated 1 December 1978, Mukerji
states he needs adequate time to prepare the report on his
work. Because the report was hurriedly assembled in about
two weeks after the committee’s decision, Mukerji felt he
had inadequate time to plead his case in detail. However,
Anand Kumar claims:
With very sound reasoning, Mukerji did not reveal all his data
because he wanted to ‘publish these in recognized scientific
journals after the reproducibility of the work is reasonably
assured’. [Mukerji] went on to state: ‘The final concentration of
DMSO used before freezing as well as the exact indigenous method
of cooling were deliberately omitted from the report, like (also)
the steps for removal of DMSO before thawing. Certain essential
intermediate steps, during the whole procedures also involving the
use of undisclosed and enriched media were completely omitted. I
had to be careful to guard our unpublished data, because by thattime I became aware of the penetrating efficiency of the tentacles
of the mass media’ (528).
Mukerji had to pay dearly for withholding this crucial
information. Not only was his claim rejected by the committee,
but the DHS also imposed strict restrictions, preventing him
from attending any conference without prior permission. Anand
Kumar provides a detailed account of events leading up to
Mukerji’s mental and emotional deterioration:
Mukerji was invited by the Primate Research Centre of Kyoto
University, Japan, on 25 January 1979, to attend a closed meeting
at their expense to discuss details of Mukerji’s work. Mukerji
applied to the DHS for permission, which was promptly denied via
their letter of 16 February 1979. The letter directed Mukerji not to
leave the country without prior clearance from the government.
Subhas Mukerji shortly afterwards suffered a heart attack. His
request for special leave was declined, but his request for transfer
was promptly accepted and, at ‘the pleasure of the Governor of
West Bengal’, he was transferred to the Regional Institute of
Ophthalmology as a professor of electrophysiology on 5 June 1981.
The government, preventing him from presenting his work at
scientific meetings, denied him leave to write up his results, and
the humiliation he was subjected to by his colleagues in Calcutta
were things that the sensitive Subhas Mukerji could not bear. His
transfer to a department in which he had no expertise was the last
straw on the proverbial camel’s back for Mukerji. This transfer
order was dated 5 June 1981. Mukerji gave up fighting the system
and ended his life on 19 July 1981, 44 days after the transfer order
was issued. Much of Mukerji’s work remained unpublished not
because he did not have data but because he was not given a
chance to do so by his administrative Ministry in the Government
(530–31).
Anand Kumar was not the first to report on the events
leading up to Mukerji’s suicide. Corea (1985) described in
great detail how Patrick Steptoe and Robert Edward’s success
led to a scramble amongst gynaecologists and physiologists
across the world. Drawing on Mukerji’s interview given to CBS
reporter Jay McMullen, and on Rajan Gupta’s report in the
Sydney Morning Herald onMukerji’s suicide, Corea (1985: 139)
gives an account of Mukerji’s claim and eventual suicide.
However, the impact of Anand Kumar’s appeal extended
beyond the medical community. Sixteen years after Mukerji’s
suicide, a Calcutta English daily newspaper, The Telegraph,
reported that India’s medical establishment was under
pressure to recognize the doctor’s work (Mukherjee, 1997).
The same article reported that Mukerji’s wife was living in ‘a
twilight of physical pain and bittersweet memories and
believed that all the moves to recognize her husband’s work
posthumously would not “bring him back”’. She, on the
contrary, hoped for the establishment of a more supportive
scientific environment than the one that drove her husband to
his death.
This sentiment notwithstanding, Anand Kumar’s assertions
at the Calcutta conference were reported in the major
national dailies and in the regional press – assertions such as
‘let me tell you that Subhash Mukerji must be given credit for
producing the first test-tube baby’, and ‘all other achieve-
ments dwarf in comparison to what he achieved’ (Mukherjee,
57The Indian IVF saga1997). The focus simultaneously shifted toMukerji’s ‘miracle’,
Durga, whose identity and that of her parents had been hidden
for 18 years. Headlines such as ‘Test Tube Baby’s Parents
Reveal All, Resurrect Scorned Scientist’ in Calcutta’s Tele-
graph (Mukherjee, 1997) and ‘Test Tube Baby, Now 18, is
Ready to Talk’ in New Delhi’s Hindustan Times (19 February
1997) added to the drama. These media accounts unanimously
identified Mukerji’s biggest shortcoming as his inability to
physically produce the baby as evidence to consolidate his
claim. Fearing social ostracism, Durga’s parents had not
allowed Mukerji to publicize the details of their daughter’s
birth in 1978, and Anand Kumar spoke of the Indian ‘psyche’
that considers barrenness to be a curse (ibid.).
Twenty years later, the story became news as a result of
Anand Kumar’s efforts. What is interesting, however, is the
evangelical zeal with which Anand Kumar campaigned to
clear Mukerji’s name. The situation is further complicated
given the fact that, by highlighting the whole issue, Anand
Kumar stood to lose his claim of association with the first
scientifically documented test-tube baby, Harsha. Recog-
nizing Mukerji as the ‘scientific father’ of the first Indian
test-tube baby, and the second-only test-tube baby in the
world, requires a degree of peer recognition and scientific
validation from the Indian scientific community that would
mark a fundamental shift in the definition of the first
‘scientifically documented test-tube baby in India’. That is
to say, the present claim to the first test-tube baby would
have to be abandoned in favour of the earlier claim of
Mukerji, and Harsha would have to be replaced by Durga.
This construction of the ‘first scientific baby produced from
a test tube’ is at the heart of the contested terrain of
assisted conception in India. I attempt to highlight the
problems surrounding these strategies and clashes of
ambitions in the following section.Birthing a contest
As discussed, there was an ongoing campaign to credit
Mukerji for engineering India’s first, and the world’s second,
test-tube baby. The genesis of ascription of ‘proper credit’
may be traced back to the birth of India’s first ‘scientifically
documented’ test-tube baby, Harsha, when the actual credit
allocation, following the media aftermath of the break-
through, completely disrupted the credibility cycle of the
scientific team responsible for the feat. What emerged was a
fundamental distinction between the multi-sited nature of
both credibility production and credibility allocation. There
was a divergence between credit and credibility as it
emerged from peers versus the media.
Baby Harsha was the product of a collaboration between
an institute controlled by the ICMR and a Bombay public
hospital. The scientific team was popularly believed (for
reasons that will become clear below) to be headed by the
collaborating pair of Anand Kumar, the medical director of
the Institute for Research in Reproduction, Bombay (IRR),
and Dr Indira Hinduja, a gynaecologist from the King Edward
Memorial Hospital, Bombay (KEM). The rest of the team was
composed of both senior and junior scientists. With the
completion of the IVF project in 1985 and 1986, India’s first
test-tube baby became a peer-reviewed reality (ICMR,
1986). Even though the information first appeared in theICMR Annual Report and did not offer the exact scientific
details, it opened the way for scientific engagement and
peer review. The publication cited the contributing team
members before more detailed data on the technique and
other accomplishments were revealed.ICMR Annual Report
Title of Project 11.8. In vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer: A collaborative project between the KEM Hospital
and the Institute for Research in Reproduction.
Project Leader Dr T. C. Anand Kumar
Project Staff Dr J. V. Iyer, Dr G. M. Ranga
Project Collaborators Dr I. Hinduja, KEM. Hospital
Dr C. P. Puri, I.R.R.
Dr T. D. Nandedkar, I.R.R.
Dr K. Gopalkrishnan, I.R.R.
Dr R. Asok Kumar, I.R.R.
Time of starting August 1985
Approximate duration Five years
Provisional date of completion 1990
The article goes on to state that the ‘in-vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer technique has been perfected and
performed as a collaborative project between the KEMHospital
and the IRR. This has resulted in the birth of the country’s first
ever, scientifically documented, test-tube baby’ (1986: 74).
The project leader and project collaborators are clearly
identified in the article. Hinduja is but one amongst five
collaborators under the project leader, Anand Kumar. The
inclusion of the KEM Hospital as a collaborating partner
recognizes Hinduja’s links with the hospital. Together IRR
and KEM created India’s first scientifically documented
test-tube baby.
India learned of this breakthrough on Doordarshan, national
television’s evening news, on the evening of 6 August 1986:
The first test-tube baby in India was born to Mrs. Mani Chawda, a
twenty-four-year-old housewife at KEM Hospital Bombay. Our
Bombay correspondent reports:
‘A pretty and healthy baby girl weighing 2.8 kgs has become India’s
first scientifically documented test-tube baby. She was born to
Mani Shanti Chawda at KEM Hospital this afternoon at the hands of
Dr Indira Hinduja. The baby was delivered by Caesarean section.
This tiny bundle is India’s first successful case of conception using
the in vitro fertilization technique, where the sperm and ovum are
fertilized outside the mother’s womb and fetus transferred inside
her for development. Dr Hinduja successfully used the technique in
close co-operation with Dr Anand Kumar and his institute for
Research in Reproduction in Bombay. We spoke to Dr Hinduja and
the child’s father, Shanti Kumar’.
The very first media account shifted the balance of credit
in favour of Hinduja. For over 10 years, media reporting
uncritically reproduced the above narrative. The precise
reasons for this are not clear. However, globally it is not
uncommon for ‘breaking news’ items to gain momentum and
become an untested and uncontested truth claim. In large
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Kumar’s intervention in 1997 problematized. Throughout the
news report, Hinduja was shown with the baby and the
hospital staff and, even as she was interviewed on camera,
project leader Anand Kumar could only be seen standing
quietly next to her. In subsequent coverage, the reporter
found it more newsworthy to interview the father of the
baby than the project leader, whose name was mentioned
only in passing as a close collaborator. Thus, in the evening
news, Hinduja practically walked away as the project leader
who, in close cooperation with Dr Anand Kumar, produced
India’s first scientifically documented test-tube baby. In a
matter of hours, from being one of the five project
collaborators, Hinduja became the person who delivered
India’s first test-tube baby, and Anand Kumar fell from the
position of project leader to that of close collaborator.
The media frenzy that followed the announcement further
developed the account provided in Doordarshan’s evening
bulletin. All leading daily newspapers were splashed with
pictures and news items on Hinduja, the newborn wonder and
her parents. Anand Kumar and the rest of the collaborating
scientific teamwere lost to the public gaze in thismediamelee.
Nor did media interest abate with time. With the dawn of the
1990s, the field of assisted conception was fully embraced by
the popular media. Coverage of infertility and of scientific
advancements in its management had become louder and
shriller (Indian Express, Bombay, 1994a,b; Indian Express,
Bombay, 1998; Sunday Observer, 1994, 1995; The Illustrated
Weekly of India, 1991; The Sunday Times of India (Delhi), 1997;
The Times of India (Bombay), 1997; The Times of India, 1998).
The intense interest generated in the media by assisted
conception was further accentuated by the entrance of
newer players in the field. Hinduja had become a cult figure
as far as IVF and other related reporting was concerned. No
media account could begin without paying tribute to the
ground-breaking achievement of the lady ‘who did it first’.Contesting claims
On 4 November 1990, in the English-language magazine The
Week, an article appeared: ‘An ill-conceived move: Research
rivalry leads to winding up of test-tube baby project’. The
article blamed the ICMR for concluding the test-tube baby
project at the IRR, Bombay. The article began by rather
dramatically asserting that the IRR was barely a ‘test tube’s
throw away’ from the King Edward Memorial Hospital of
Bombay, and yet a ‘yawning gulf’ had suddenly emerged
between the two, whose joint effort saw the birth of India’s
first test-tube baby (Rao, 1990). The article went on to quote
the director of ICMR:
Dr AS Paintal, director of the ICMR, under whose wings IRR has
been hiding cosily all these years, had this belated explanation:
‘The major reason for winding up the IVF unit is that Dr Indira
Hinduja’s (she was the brain behind India’s first test-tube baby)
project has already proved its success. and we thought she could
continue her studies outside, whereas the IRR’s funds could be
utilised for other important projects’ (Rao, 1990).
There are two very interesting indications in this extract.
First, as early as 1990 it appears firmly established even in theofficial (ICMR) circles that the test-tube baby was Hinduja’s
project. It is surprising that the director in the previous
quote describes the project – funded by a government council
(ICMR) and executed by an institute (IRR), supported in
collaboration with a public hospital (KEM) – as ‘Dr Hinduja’s
project’. It tells us something significant about the inroads
made by the media and by popular representations of India’s
first scientifically documented test-tube baby into the
official vocabulary. Second, it exposes the enunciatory
function of the media. The information provided in the
all-important brackets, inserted into the objective quote of
the interviewee, is made available for the less-informed reader
who, in case he or she had missed the crucial details about
Hinduja’s central role, should be made aware of ‘the brain’
behind the project. The article goes on to state that slashing
the ICMR’s Rs 340 million budget by 20% is used to justify the
project’s termination and further asserts that the figure of Rs
10 million ‘gobbled up by IVF is inflated perhaps to justify its
killing’ (Rao, 1990). Citing modest expenses on the project
(from the IRR annual report), the article goes on to argue that
the test-tube baby research was never a ‘white elephant’ for
the IRR. The root of the problem is attributed to conflict of
interest within the IRR:
Another vital aspect is professional jealousy: the impression that
Hinduja, who is on the rolls of the KEM Hospital, has been hogging
the limelight and depriving the IRR scientists, who have been
handling the lab side of the IVF project, [of] their share of the glory.
Ironically, there was perfect harmony within the IVF unit, but the
so-called experts within the IRRwho have nothing to do with the IVF
project have been fomenting trouble (Rao, 1990).
Although this article makes a strong case for the IVF team’s
faultless harmony, the team members gave a very different
account when I contacted them, on the condition of strict
anonymity. One team member, when contacted on 13 and
21 April 1998, spoke of the gynaecologists’ ‘arrogant’ and
‘uncompromising’ attitude, which led to the project’s col-
lapse. ‘The publicity-hungry individuals associated with the
project’, the informant went on to say, ‘created an atmo-
sphere of dejection and frustration’ amongst the real scientific
‘think tank’ behind the project. Those involved were reported
as pulling in different directions: whereas some were more
interested in ‘promoting themselves’, others were too ‘dis-
gruntled’ because their ‘behind-the-scenes hard work was not
being appreciated’ and they were being ‘systematically
side-tracked’, even as the limelight remained on a chosen few.
The tendency to eclipse the ‘other’ emerges as the basis of
this contest for credibility. On the one hand, the scientific
team claims it was kept at arm’s length from credit (reward)
and their credibility (ability to do science) could not attain its
potential because they weremarginalized. On the other hand,
the principals, Anand Kumar and Hinduja, appear to have
pursued an approach of mutual obfuscation. There are few
documented media accounts where one openly refers to the
other as a collaborating partner. The closest each protagonist
comes to acknowledging the other in interviews and in other
accounts on the issue of the first test-tube baby is to name
the collaborating institutes. The two institutes have been
bestowed with a metonymic quality, representing respective-
ly the two collaborators. Anand Kumar, for instance, made the
following assertion in his article on Mukerji:
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pre-eminently qualified and experienced to delve into whatever
material was available regarding Mukerji’s past work and throw
light on it. The reason for this assumption perhaps lay in my having
played a key role in the birth of another test-tube baby, Harsha, on
6 August 1986. This birth was announced bymyself, when I was the
director of the ICMR’s Institute for Research in Reproduction, and
Dr. G. B. Parulekar, dean of our collaborating institution, KEM
Hospital, Bombay... I published our technical report and proce-
dural details in the ICMR Bulletin. The work leading to Harsha’s
birth was executed by a team of scientists from the IRR and
clinicians from the KEM Hospital working under my direct guidance
and supervision (1997: 526).
The argument is bluntly clear on three counts. First, the
name ‘Hinduja’, which had become synonymous in the
media with the birth of the first test-tube baby, is absent.
Her ‘claims’ are openly resisted by reminding the readers of
the ICMR Bulletin (cited previously). The primacy of
peer-reviewed documentation over popular media accounts
is openly asserted. It is also noteworthy that Hinduja’s name
is conspicuously absent, even while the KEM Hospital and the
name of the dean of the collaborating institute is included.
Second, the distinction between the IRR and KEM is
constructed on a clear-cut scientific hierarchy of scientists
over clinicians. A sense of our (IRR) scientists and their (KEM)
clinicians is asserted to reclaim the ‘reality’ glossed over by
media representations, such as Hinduja as ‘the brain’ behind
the project. Third, and of most significance, is the emphasis
on phrases such as ‘key role’ and ‘my direct guidance and
supervision’, which completely underplay the importance
and even the extent of the collaborating hospital’s contri-
bution and its now-famous collaborating partner, Dr Indira
Hinduja.End of a saga
In 2016 the controversy seems settled. On 26 January 2010,
Anand Kumar passed away, ending his illustrious career. A
glowing obituary in the Indian Journal of Medical Research
(2010) observes:
A man who stood for truth had the greatness to give away his fame
and glory of being the pioneer of India’s first test-tube baby when
he discovered all the handwritten notes of Dr Subhas Mukerjee. Dr
Mukerjee from Kolkata had claimed to have created a test-tube
baby in 1979 (the second in the world), but his claims were neither
substantiated nor recognized by scientists nor the authorities,
leading to the man ending his life prematurely. Dr Anand Kumar
had the courage to research his predecessors’ findings and
scientifically present it to the world, giving Dr Mukerjee his due
place inmedical history. Such generosity and honesty are very rare
and precious attributes of Dr Anand Kumar (Mehta, 2010: 466–67).
Anand Kumar succeeded in crediting Mukerji as the
pioneer of Indian IVF. He lived to see many landmark
developments post-1997, following his concerted efforts. In
2002, the ICMR acknowledged Mukerji’s contributions in the
National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and
Regulation of ART Clinics in India. In 2004, the ICMR directordelivered a memorial oration named after Mukerji. In 2005,
as a rather belated sign of recognition, the West Bengal
Health and Family Welfare Department erected a plaque in
Mukerji’s memory. In 2007, Mukerji’s life story and work
were published in the Dictionary of Medical Biography by the
London-based Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of
Medicine. These accolades further cemented the claim that
Mukerji was responsible for the second test-tube baby in the
world within two months of Steptoe and Edwards’s break-
through. In the same year, 2007, Mukerji’s work was
recognized by the Brazilian Medical Society in Sao Paulo.
Predictably, a controversy born and bred in the mass media
had a very public culmination in the media spotlight. In April
2011, India’s ‘first test-tube baby’ broke her silence and
appeared as the cover story, ‘The Doc Who Gave Me Life and
Killed Himself’, in a popular Indian weekly magazine, The
Week (3 April 2011). The editorial reads:
Angst lay buried in their bosom for 30 years, heaving with muted
melancholy every now and then. They allowed hope to bloom
instead. Now, two women who are part of one of India’s biggest
achievements have decided to bare their heart (sic)…in this week’s
cover story, both reveal the beauty and the beast behind what is
now accepted as India’s first test-tube baby. One woman is the
test-tube baby; the other is the wife of the man who was hounded
and called a fraud, making him end the misery by taking his life…It
may be a story straight out of the Roald Dhal stable–dark,
depressing, and sad–but it is also about hope. It has many heroes:
a crusading Sunit Mukherjee, who continued to believe that his
friend Subhas the pioneer was a genius; the wife who stood by her
husband who chose his research over her; Kanupriya’s [‘the first
test-tube baby’] parents, who decided to take a gamble; T. C.
Anand Kumar, who chose to give up his claim to history to hand it
over to a man who had been discredited; and finally Kanupriya,
who was brave enough to come out and lend her voice to this
cause. ‘Dr Anand told me Subhas Mukherji did this because he had
to, for the greater cause of humanity. It wasn’t just for me’, she
says. ‘I can’t let him go down in history as a wannabe’, Kanupriya
adds. Neither should India.’
(Matthew, 2011: 3)
The history of Indian IVF was rewritten on the confluence
of a series of contests, claims, counter-claims and eventual
closure. The history of IVF in India also mirrors the uneven
nature of global scientific terrain and the contests over
demarcations that cordon off normative ‘good science’ from
incompliant and maverick ‘bad science’ (Bharadwaj, 2013b).
Adjudicating ‘good’ and ‘bad’ modality of doing science can
have its own rewards. For example, by raising Mukerji’s
claim, Anand Kumar stood to lose his association with the
birth of India’s first test-tube baby. However, it can be
hypothesized that Anand Kumar lost nothing at all, as his
credibility – which is well documented in peer citations –
remains intact. The professional credit of being associated
with the first scientifically documented test-tube baby is
more or less secure. What he lacked, however, was credit of
a different kind that no number of peer citations can
generate. This credit or reward is what his scientific partner,
Hinduja, walked away with. While Hinduja basked in the
spotlight of the media, her peers also recognize her as an
able scientist and clinician.
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ity generated by media accounts can obfuscate peer-reviewed
scientific endorsements. As argued elsewhere, in the closing
decade of the 20th century journalistic discourses on science
in India became fixated with a ‘marvels of science’ style
(Bharadwaj, 2000: 63). The media/medicine nexus at this time
morphed news reportage into publicity-driven ‘institutional
advertisements’ (Dyck, 1995). In the late 1990s, many
entrepreneurial IVF practitioners in India were actively
engaged in a process of ingratiation with journalists to
ensure favourable depiction in the media (AB, field notes).
This is not to suggest that the protagonists in this article
were similarly implicated. On the contrary, their reputa-
tions were clearly established as pioneers in the field thanks
to the high-profile events of 1986 and 1997. However, what
the article has tried to show is that the peer-documented
credit Hinduja and Anand Kumar shared is different from the
credit generated by media accounts, which focused on
Hinduja alone until 1997.
More generally, credibility (i.e. a scientist’s ability to do
science) is only a point of departure. The continual upkeep
and regeneration, through a quest for credible reward and
recognition, are the mainstays of scientific enterprise when it
acquires a commercial face. This helps us understand how
scientists respond to demands made outside the scientific
terrain. There, the market (infertile patients) judges the
credibility of an expert not from what his or her peers have to
say – though that is centrally important to the scientists’
survival in their own field – but more from media represen-
tation of the experts. The media adulation and ‘institutional
advertisements’ further cemented the reputation of the
protagonists in this story as India’s leading experts in the
field. However, this is not to suggest that the media helped
perpetuate a fiction in the marketplace. At best it can be
hypothesized that experts with painstakingly earned,
peer-endorsed reputations were turned into household
names for a period of time, which furthered their reach into
the infertility market. In this respect it is important to
conceptually separate credit and credibility because publicity
andmedia interest generate not only commercial gain but also
fame. It would be unfair to assert that the protagonists in this
story were motivated simply by pursuit of financial reward.
But rather, as the article has shown, their struggles were first
and foremost over redistribution of proper credit and
recognition.
Additionally, the history of IVF echoes a consistent
feature within Indian scientific imaginary: the presence of
a non-conformist, sometimes eccentric, albeit largely
condemned, maverick and an extremely charismatic scien-
tist and/or clinician, working alone and often against
mounting global condemnation (also see Bharadwaj,
2013a,b,c). To this day, IVF is still producing wilful and
‘fringe’ practitioners in India like Mukerji who dare to
rewrite the rules authored elsewhere in the world of ‘big
science’ and ‘big capital’, located in value chains that
stretch from ‘big geopolitical’ spheres of influence to ‘big
global scientific conglomerations’. In this respect the Indian
IVF saga offers a unique antidote to an approach to history that
Dipesh Chakrabarty describes as based on the conviction:first in the West and then elsewhere (Chakrabarty, 2000: 6).
That is, the events documented in this article also help us to
imagine how Mukerji’s losing battle was only possible in a
normative global order where Europe is seen as the only
viable crucible of breakthrough innovations. This view
reinforces an active imagination of all other modes of
innovation as merely provincial and thus obfuscates the
actual flow of ideas across the geopolitical landscape of
science in the 20th century. In the end this also explains the
irony-saturated history of IVF. While Edwards, the IVF
pioneer in Britain, eventually received a Nobel Prize for
his contribution (albeit more than 30 years after the event),
Mukerji, a controversial ‘maverick’ in India, was driven to
suicide and forgotten, only remembered posthumously as
part of contemporary battles over scientific prestige and
pre-eminence that animate current stakes in India’s
reputation as a leader in reproductive medicine.References
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